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COMMENTS

GRIFFIN v. CALIFORNIA:
STILL VIABLE AFTER ALL THESE YEARS
Craig M. Bradley*
In Gr!ffin v. Cal!fornia 1 the Supreme Court held that a provision

of the California Constitution allowing adverse comment by the
judge and the prosecutor on a criminal defendant's failure to testify
violated the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution.2
The essence of the Court's brief opinion was expressed in a few lines:
[C]omment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the "inquisitorial
system of criminal justice" . . . which the Fifth Amendment outlaws.
It is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly.3

Griffin was a response to prosecutorial argument of the sort made in
Linebarger v. Ok/ahoma. 4 In that burglary case where the defen-

dant, who had a prior burglary conviction, did not testify, witnesses
reported that the prosecutor's (unrecorded) argument involved
pointing his finger at the defendant and exclaiming, "Larry Gail
Linebarger, why don't you take the stand in your own defense? Because you know you are guilty."5
In a recent article in the Michigan Law Review, Donald Ayer
levels a series of attacks on the Griffin decision. 6 Specifically, he
maintains that the decision is at once too broad, because it requires
"almost automatic reversal where there are any remarks explicitly
focused on the defendant's silence and the inference of guilt to be
* Associate Professor, Indiana University School of Law (Bloomington). A.B. 1967, University of North Carolina; J.D. 1970, University of Virginia. Former Assistant United States
Attorney, Washington, D.C. - Ed.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professors Stanley Fickle and Alex
Tanford for their extremely helpful advice in the preparation of this Comment.
I. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
2.
3.
4.
5.

380 U.S. at 613.
380 U.S. at 614 (footnotes omitted).
404 F.2d 1092 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 938 (1969).
404 F.2d at 1094. The court in Linebarger conceded that such an argument was barred
by Gr!!fin but, because of conflicting reports of witnesses, could not be sure whether the argument had actually occurred as the witnesses had reported.
6. Ayer, The Fffeh Amendment and the Inference of Guiltfrom Silence: Gr!IJin v. Cal!/ornla
Afler Fffeeen Years, 18 MICH. L. REv. 841 (1980).
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drawn from it" 7 regardless of the strength of the prosecution's case,
and too narrow, because it fails to prevent the natural prejudice
against the nontestifying defendant that may arise in the minds of
the jurors without any encouragement from prosecutor or judge.8
Ayer also contends that prosecutors should be permitted to argue
that a defendant's failure to testify is evidence that he is guilty because such an argument is "rational" and advances the search for
truth. 9 Finally, he urges that the Griffin rule finds no basis in the
fifth amendment and its historic purposes. 10
This Comment challenges all three of Mr. Ayer's arguments. It
takes the position that the limitations on prosecutorial conduct established in Griffin remain an important and logically defensible protection of the defendant's fifth amendment right not to testify.
Moreover, it argues that Ayer's attacks on the Griffin doctrine are
based upon a fundamental misconception about the reasons criminal
defendants choose not to testify at trial.
Ayer's opening attack on Griffin is to maintain that the opinion is
both too broad and too narrow. His broadness attack -·that the
opinion mandates reversal for almost any violation of the "no comment" rule-is curious in light of Griffin's successor case, Chapman
v. Cal!fomia, 11 which was decided two years later. Chapman held
that a violation of the Griffin rule did not require ''virtually automatic" reversal, as Ayer charges, 12 but rather only shifted the burden
to the government to prove ''beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." 13 As
Ayer recognizes in another part of his article, federal courts are
"commonly'' able to conclude that improper prosecutorial comment
in a particular case does not require reversal, usually because the
prosecution's case was so strong that the offending comment was
thought to have had no impact on the guilty verdict. 14
7. Id. at 844.
8. Id. at 845.
9. Id. at 855.
10. Id. at 848-52.
11. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
12. Ayer, supra note 6, at 844.
13. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
14. See Ayer, supra note 6, at 846 & nn.22 & 23. Ayer concludes that these cases show that
the lower federal courts have given Griffin a "grudging reception," and that this attitude by the
lower courts "offers another, empirical ground for reevaluation." Id. at 846.
To conclude that application of the Chapman doctrine to Griffin violations precisely as
mandated by the Supreme Court indicates that the lower courts disapprove of Griffin is an
exercise of judicial psychoanalysis that I cannot follow. A reading of the cases cited by Ayer
discloses no criticism of the Griffin rule, either express or implied, but simply a common-sense
application of Chapman, in which the Supreme Court itself limited Griffin. If popularity were
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Ayer's "narrowness" attack also misses the mark. It is certainly
true, as the Court recognized in Gr!lfin, that no ruling by the Court
could stop a jury from inferring guilt from silence if it were so inclined.15 While this is accurate, it does not follow that the Court
should abandon rules that increase fairness solely because they cannot ensure an absolutely fair trial in every single case. Gr!lfin adds to
the protections afforded the defendant. To abolish the no comment
rule, as Ayer urges, would diminish those protections. 16 Consequently, while Gr!lfin may be "narrow'' in that it fails to completely
solve the problem of prejudice toward a nontestifying defendant, it is
far less "narrow'' than Ayer's proposed solution.17
Ayer's second argument makes a basic assumption which underthe test of the validity of Supreme Court pronouncements, it is hard to imagine a decision that
would have been more readily accepted than Gr!flin, since its "no comment" rule was already
the law in 44 states and, by statute, in federal jurisdictions. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609, 611-12 nn. 3 & 4 (1965); 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1976).
In any event, Ayer's "empirical" data, Ayer, supra note 6, at 846, is incorrect. See Annot.,
14 A.L.R.3d 730-46 (1967), for a discussion of the many state and federal cases, both before
and after Gr!f!in, where convictions were reversed due to the violation of the "no comment"
rule. See, e.g., United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v.
Handman, 447 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1971). Many other courts have found harmless error in
particular cases. See Ayer, supra note 6, at 846 n.23.
15. It is said . . . that the inference of guilt for failure to testify . . . is in any event
natural and irresistible, and that comment on the failure does not magnify that inference
into a penalty for asserting a constitutional right. . . . What the jury may infer, given no
help from the Court, is one thing. What it may infer when the Court solemnizes the
silence of the accused into evidence against him is quite another.
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (citation omitted).
16. Ayer implies that he disagrees with the Court's conclusion in Gr!f!in that prosecutorial
comment upon failure to testify is a "penalty," 380 U.S. at 614, by saying that "undue
prejudice cannot be assumed." Ayer, supra note 6, at 846. While the question of what is "due"
or ''undue" is where I take issue with Ayer, there should be no misunderstanding that such
comment is harmful to the defendant. See Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 196-97
(1943). The jury will undoubtedly speculate as to why the defendant fails to testify, but the
damage is considerably greater when prosecutors like the one in Gr!f!in list all of the matters as
to which the defendant had exclusive knowledge "but has not seen fit •.. to explain." 380
U.S. at 611 (1965).
17. Another general criticism that Ayer levels at the opinion is that it was the product ofan
excess of zeal on the part of the Warren Court, decided "at the peak of its enthusiasm to
expand the constitutional protection of criminal defendants." Ayer, supra note 6, at 841. Gr!fjin was, he says, ''the first Supreme Court decision to hold comment on a defendant's failure to
testify offensive to the constitutional right of silence." Id. at 842 n. 7. This is technically true
but misleading. A federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1976) (enacted in 1948) forbade
prosecutorial comment on the defendant's failure to testify and for this reason, a constitutional
holding was not required until the fifth amendment was applied to the states in Malloy v.
Hagan, 378 U.S. I (1964), decided shortly before Gr!f!in. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609, 619-20 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court had specifically
recognized that the purpose of the statute was ''to protect this [fifth amendment] right." Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. I, 2 (1961). See also Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189,
196-97 (1943) (quoting a holding of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that "no inferences
whatever can be legitimately drawn . . . from the legal assertion by the [defendant] of his
constitutional right" for to do so would be a "mockery of justice"). The Gr!flin Court was
hardly writing on a clean slate in terms of recognizing the ''no comment" rule as part of the
fifth amendment right to silence.
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lies his entire article and with which I strongly disagree. He assumes
that the inference of guilt from silence is "rational" because "a
wrongfully accused person will want to speak up and present his
story." 18 Because of that assumed rationality, Ayer concludes that
the burden imposed by prosecutorial comment on the defendant's
silence is indistinguishable from other burdens upon the exercise of
constitutional rights that the Court has permitted. It is the position
of thi~ Comment that such a prosecutorial argument is impermissible
because it asks the jury to draw an unjustifiable inference from the
exercise of a constitutional right.
It is true that it is a basic human impulse to deny a charge of
criminal wrongdoing, but it is an impulse that is common to guilty
and innocent defendants alike. The appropriate inference to be
drawn from the failure to deny is simply this: a person, guilty or innocent, w11! deny guilt unless he perceives that the denial will be more
costly than silence.
The arrested defendant's natural impulse when dealing with the
police is to try to exculpate himself, regardless of whether he is in
fact guilty or innocent. In Miranda v. Arizona 19 the Court, recognizing this tendency, held that the defendant must be warned of the
rights to silence and counsel before being encouraged by police to
give in to that impulse. Miranda was followed by Doyle v. Ohio ,20
which held that an assertion of the right to silence by an arrestee
could not be used against him at trial because such an assertion was
"insolubly ambiguous." 21 One simply could not know what had impelled the arrestee to refuse to speak, and no inference of guilt could
therefore be drawn from that refusal. 22
At trial the assertion of the right to silence is even more ambiguous because it is inevitably a decision of counsel (or with counsel's
advice) rather than of the accused alone. Counsel weighs the costs of
18. Ayer, supra note 6, at 855. Ayer recognizes, as did the Court in Gr!ffen, that there are
other possible explanations for silence besides guilt, such as excessive timidity or nervousness
or the fear of impeachment with prior convictions. Id. at 855 n.57. However, he brushes these
aside by observing that "(c)ommon sense would indicate that neither of these concerns would
deter an innocent defendant from having his say in court, except in the most extraordinary of
circumstances," Id. at 855-56 n.57, and that it is "contrary to human nature" for an innocent
person who fears impeachment with prior convictions not to testify. Id. at 868 n.121. In any
case, he argues that even if such factors do motivate defendants "a significant fraction of the
time," the inference of guilt from silence is still rational because "the inferred fact (guilt) [is]
'more likely than not to flow from' the established fact (silence). County Court of Ulster
County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 165 (1979)." Id. at 856 n.57.
19. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
20. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
21. 426 U.S. at 617.
22. 426 U.S. at 617-18.
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not testifying (the fear that the jury will hold it against the defendant, the inability to tell his full story, etc.) against the costs of testifying. The latter may include the defendant's unconvincing demeanor,
confusion, or faulty memory as to details of his story, and especially,
the fear that he will be impeached with prior convictions.23
A leading trial manual has listed various reasons why defense
counsel may decide whether or not to have his client testify. They
include:
(A) The desirability

of having the

defendant appear to "come clean. ,,

(B) Whether the defendant has something to say that is legally and/actu-

ally supportive of the theory of the defense. . . .
(C) Whether what he has to say can be shown by other witnesses.
(D) Whether what he has to say, and the way he says it, are credible.

Both the inherent plausibility of his story and his demeanor are important. . . .
(E) Whether the defendant is likeable or distasteful, sympathetic or obnoxious, etc. . . . Does he make a better impression with his mouth
shut, or open?
(F) Whether the defendant has a prior record. . . .
(G)-(1) [Whether there is potentially damaging evidence or impeachment matter to which defendant's testimony will open the door.]
(J) Whether cross-examination of the defendant is likely to supply deficiencies or bolster weaknesses in the prosecution's case in chief.24

Nowhere among the factors to be considered is the question of
whether the defendant is, or whether his attorney believes that he is,
actually guilty. While that fact will influence such matters as the
credibility of his story or the existence of impeachment evidence, the
question of actual guilt is essentially irrelevant. Rather, appearances
are what are important. It is easy to conceive of a guilty defendant
who is able to make such a good impression that his counsel will.
want him to testify. It is equally easy to conceive of an innocent
defendant who is so ugly, or stupid, or who has such a poor memory
of the facts surrounding the events in question that his counsel will
not want him to testify.2s
23. See Bradley, Havens, Jenkins, and Salvucci, and the JJefendanl's "Right" lo Test!/)', 18
at least when it
involves a crime similar to the one at bar - as being inconsistent with the defendant's due
process right to testify).
24. A. AMsTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIM·
INAL CASES§ 390 (1967) (emphasis original).
25. Consider an innocent defendant who was at home alone and asleep at the time of the
robbery he is alleged to have committed. Such an uncorroborated alibi would almost certainly
not be presented if a single other negative feature (prior conviction, poor demeanor, etc.) is
present Even though the defendant is actually innocent, his testimony will not create that
appearance and he will be held off the stand. Similarly, consider an innocent defendant who is
charged with having participated in a conspiracy that took place some seven years before trial,
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 419, 431 n.121 (1981) (criticizing such impeachment -
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While my conclusion that the inference of guilt from silence is
irrational may be considered as simply my view of "common sense"
versus that of Ayer,26 there is doctrinal support for the position that I
take. Ayer analyzes the historic purposes of the fifth amendment
and concludes that the Grfllin rule finds no basis in them. 27 The purpose advanced by Ayer that is most pertinent to this discussion is
"the enhancement of human dignity by sparing guilty defendants the
unhappy choice between harmful disclosure, contempt, or perjury."28 If this is the purpose of the amendment, it follows that it is
rational to infer that one who asserts it is likely to be guilty. But the
Supreme Court has identified an additional purpose that the fifth
amendment serves, beyond those stated by Ayer:
Recent re-examination of the history and meaning of the Fifth
Amendment has emphasized anew that one of the basic functions of
the privilege is to protect innocent men. . . . ''Too many, even those
of us who should be better advised, view this privilege as a shelter for
wrongdoers. They too readily assume that those who invoke it are either guilty of crime or commit perjury in claiming the privilege."29

Of course, Ayer is on firm ground when he quotes the pertinent
language of the fifth amendment that no one "shall be compelled
and who simply has no recollection of the events charged. Again, such a defendant will almo~t
surely not testify, despite his innocence. See also H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN
JURY 146 (1966). Kalven & Zeisel discovered that defendants without a criminal record elect
to testify 37% more often than defendants with a record of past convictions.
26. However, Ayer's view that the innocent are more likely to deny guilt than the guilty
has been debunked by no less a friend of law enforcement than Chief Justice Burger. In
disagreeing with the assertion of the Court in Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)
that "the innocent are more likely to [remain silent] in secret proceedings ... than in open
court proceedings,'' he averred:
(T]here is not a scintilla of empirical data to support [this] generalization. . . . It is no
more accurate than to say, for example, that the innocent rather than the guilty, are the
first to protest their innocence. There is simply no basis for declaring a generalized
probability one way or the other.
United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 181 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
27. Ayer, supra note 6, at 848-52.
28. Id. at 849 (emphasis in original). The other purposes cited by Ayer are (1) "the deterrence of torture and other forms of outright coercion"; (2) "the assurance of fairness in criminal procedure by cultivating a proper relationship between citizens and their government - or
more precisely, by requiring the prosecution to develop and prove a criminal case without help
from the defendant"; and (3) ''the protection of free expression and association." Id. at 84849. See note 31 infra for a discussion of how Ayer's proposal would also run afoul of the
second stated purpose of the amendment.
29. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391,421 (1957) (quoting Ulman v. United States,
350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956))(emphasis original).
In Grunewald the Court held that a defendant who testifies at trial cannot be cross-examined as to his assertion of the right to silence in the grand jury for the reasons stated in the
text. The holding in Gr!ftin would, it seems, follow inevitably from the reasoning, if not the
holding, of Grunewald (Grunewald was a supervisory, not a constitutional, decision). Cf.
United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975) (defendant who offered alibi on the witness stand
was improperly questioned about his earlier silence during a police interrogation). But see
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
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. . . to be a witness against himself," and notes that the practice condemned in Gr!flin did not "compel" testimony in the strict sense of
the word, but rather merely imposed a burden on nontestimony.30
And Ayer is surely correct in observing that, according to recent decisions of the Court, the finding of a burden "is where the analysis
begins, not where it ends."31 But given that there are a variety of
reasons, totally consistent with innocence, that may impel one to exercise his fifth amendment right to silence, it follows that to allow the
judge or prosecutor to tell the jury that such an exercise is evidence
of guilt is not "rational" and should not be permitted. The drawing
of an "irrational" inference from the exercise of a constitutional
right is clearly an impermissible burden.32
Even if I were to agree with Ayer as to the rationality of the inference of guilt, I would still contend that the burden imposed by
that inference upon the exercise of a constitutional right is impermissible. It is true, as Ayer points out, that there are many burdens
associated with the exercise of constitutional rights. For instance,
pressure to testify "arises from the evidence in the case and the defendant's fear that the jury will draw the adverse inference on its
own."33 Obviously, as the Court recognized in Gr!flin, it is one thing
for the defendant to be faced with a difficult choice because of the
nature of a criminal trial.3 4 It is quite another for the government to
impose a specific penalty (as such comment surely is) upon the exercise of a constitutional right.35
30. See Carter v. Kentucky, 101 S. Ct. 1112, 1122 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) ("A defendant who chooses not to testify hardly can claim that he was compelled to testify") (emphasis
original).
31. Ayer, supra note 6, at 855.
While prosecutorial comment arguably does not "compel" testimony, it may be said to
compel self-incrimination. The prosecutor's argument is that the defendant's silence should be·
considered as evidence against him - that is, that the silence is incriminating. Thus, incrimination is compulsory by being unavoidable. By allowing the prosecutor to use the defendant's
silence as evidence, Ayer's proposal would also violate his third historic purpose of the fifth
amendment - "requiring the prosecution to develop and prove a criminal case without help
from the defendant." Id. at 849. If the no comment rule is abolished the defendant can't
avoid "helping" the prosecution, for either silence or testimony will be used against him. Ayer
concedes that "the defendant's decision to remain silent is not a testimonial or communicative
act," id. at 868, and then proposes to turn it into such an act by letting the prosecutor argue
that it is evidence of guilt.
32. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 841-43 (1973) and cases cited therein.
33. Ayer, supra note 6, at 858.
34. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 133, 211-13 (1971).
35. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979), upon which Ayer relies,
Ayer, supra note 6, at 859-61, can thus be distinguished. The inference of possession of firearms from the fact that the defendants were found in an automobile where such firearms were
present is, the Court found, "rational," 442 U.S. at 165, unlike the inference of guilt from
silence. Moreover, the presumption in Ulster County was simply a factual presumption arising
out of a series of events, not out of the defendant's exercise of a constitutional right. It bur-
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There is one line of cases that seems to lend some support to
Ayer's view that, though prosecutorial comment may burden the
right to silence, it is not an impermissible burden. In Corbitt v. New
Jersey 36 the Court upheld a statute that imposed a mandatory life
term upon conviction by a jury but gave the judge discretion to impose a lesser penalty upon conviction by a plea of "non vult." The
petitioner argued that such a scheme placed an impermissible burden upon his assertion of a right to a jury trial. The Court held that
encouraging guilty pleas "by offering substantial benefits in return
for the plea" was permissible.
Even assuming that these sixth amendment cases may be analogized to the exercise of a fifth amendment right, they may be readily
distinguished. In contrast to plea negotiations, in which the defendant may bargain for certain benefits in exchange for waiving the
right to a jury trial, the defendant in the Grtftin situation is faced
with a Robson's choice. if, for instance, he will be impeached with
prior convictions ifhe takes the stand, then to testify will cause him a
serious detriment. If he chooses not to testify, and the prosecutor
and the judge instruct the jury that his failure to do so is evidence of
guilt, then he suffers a different detriment by being, in effect, "incriminated" by his silence. He does not, as in Corbitt, exchange a
right for a benefit - no matter what he does, he suffers a detriment.
A comparable case, in the jury trial context, would be one in which
the judge instructs the jury that people who choose jury trials are
likely to be guilty. This, I trust, Ayer does not advocate. 37
dened only the defendant's exercise of his right to silence in the sense that it strengthened the
prosecution's case. It was in no sense a "penalty" for exercise of a constitutional right. In
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973), which involved the presumption of guilty knowledge from the unexplained possession of stolen property, the Court rejected such a "penalty"
claim out of hand:
.
Introduction of any evidence, direct or circumstantial, tending to implicate the defendant
in the alleged crime increases the pressure on him to testify. The mere massing of evidence against a defendant cannot be regarded as a violation of the privilege aglllllSt selfincrimination.
412 U.S. at 847.
By contrast, the comment forbidden by Gr!/fin is not simply a logical evidentiary inference,
but is a penalty that the defendant would have to pay for exercising his right to silence. Even
if it were true that defendants who fail to testify are more likely to be guilty, none of the cases
cited by Ayer support the proposition that the exercise of a constitutional right may permissibly give rise to such an argument. Doyle. v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), is precisely to the
contrary. Cf. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (Court held that it was
"intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered to assert another'').
36. 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
37. Actually this inference may be more "rational" than the inference of guilt from silence.
It was a well known maxim among defense attorneys in the criminal courts of the District of
Columbia that you never waived a jury trial unless you believed that your client was innocent.
In cases where the weight of the evidence was against the defendant there was always the
possibility that the jury, due to sympathy, confusion, prejudice or some other unexpected rea-
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The abolition of the Griffin rule would indeed be a substantial
boon to prosecutors. To the extent that one feels that prosecutors
have been unduly hamstrung by the Supreme Court's view of the
Constitution, arguments that the rule should be abandoned are appealing. Indeed, any prosecutor would be cheered by the possibilities for accusatorial histrionics that adoption of Ayer's proposal
would afford. Unfortunately for prosecutors, the Griffin rule is not
so thin a reed as Ayer portrays it. Rather, the rule is firmly rooted in
a basic truism: There are many reasons apart from guilt - particularly fear of impeachment with prior convictions - that may cause a
defendant, upon advice of counsel, to choose not to testify. To allow
the prosecutor to argue that failure to testify is evidence of guilt is
thus irrational and inconsistent with our traditional understanding of
the fifth amendment privilege.38 Such argument is therefore an impermissible burden on the right of silence.

son, might find him not guilty or at least hang. By contrast, the defendant's decision not to
testify is, in most cases, totally unrelated to his guilt or innocence.
38. Beyond the express reasoning of the Court in Griffin, a due process rationale can be
advanced to support the "no co=ent rule." That is, that what the government gives with one
hand it cannot take away with the other. In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the Court held
that it was "fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process" for the authorities to
advise a suspect of his right to silence and then use that exercise of silence against him at trial.
426 U.S. at 618. Accord, Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943). Certainly advice of
counsel as to one's rights in the courtroom should be accorded as much deference as such
advice by the police.
This unfairness problem could be solved by simply advising the defendant that, while he
has a right to silence, its exercise may be the subject of adverse co=ent, as is done in Germany. See Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans J)o It, 78 MICH. L.
REv. 204, 208 (1979). While such a procedure would solve this problem, it would not solve the
more fundamental problem discussed in this Comment: that such prosecutorial argument is
not rational.

